A Crack in the China: CDT on the Defensive

Cofer and Appley (1964) begin to criticize CDT when they say, 'specification of dissonance....as a general motive rests on a theoretical confusion between motives and motivational states' (source 8). Chapanis and Chapanis (1964) begin to criticize CDT as hard to prove and, therefore, flawed (source 6). Bem (1965) advances the notion of placing many dissonance phenomena under the semantic umbrella of 'self-perception' theory. Bem proposes that cognitive dissonance experiments get results because of the judgmental, self-observational abilities of the subjects rather than because of the motivational underpinnings of CDT (source 8). The line in the dirt had been drawn and the battle to defend CDT had begun.

Aronson (1968) addresses the methodology issues in CDT that are beginning to surface among researchers. Aronson argues eloquently in defense of CDT. Aronson cites a need for 'purification' experiments in order to prove CDT. Aronson draws on two similar, yet different, experiments (Aronson and Mills, 1959 and Gerard and Mathewson, 1966) to illustrate purification. Both experiments studied the effects of serverity of initiation to liking a group. One experiment had young women recite sexually explicit material in front of a male as initiation and the other experiment used electric shock as initiation. According to Arsonson, a double study like this one, would eliminate other possible alternative explanations for the results, such as sexual arousal and pain.

Both sets of researchers found data supporting CDT. They found that the more severe initiation procedures created higher dissonance rates which translated into higher perceived attractiveness of the groups the subjects joined after successful initiation. This correlates to CDT which states that high dissonance (difficult initiation procedures) leads to dissonance reduction activities which leads to higher perceived attractiveness of the subject's group of choice (source 6). Aronson points out that similar data from two different experiments eliminates possible alternative explanations for the results and, therefore, serves to strenthgen the reliability of CDT. Aronson concludes by saying, "A good deal of research has been done since 1957, many problems with CDT have been solved....many new problems have been unearthed...all CDT does is generate new research" (source 6).

Aronson, Chase, Helmreich and Ruhnke (1974) explore the factors 'feeling stupid' and 'feeling guilty' leading to a sense of 'awfulness' which produces dissonance arousal. The researchers hypothesized that individuals, who after making a public statement inconsistent with their private opinion and knowing in advance that it will adversely affect another person, will experience a heightened sense of responsibility toward those affected which in turn leads to feelings of guilt and stupidity which in turn leads to dissonance arousal. The individuals are then motivated to change their private opinion to match their public statement as a means of dissonance reduction. The results of their research did support this hypothesis (source 7).

In a massive scholarly work, titled "Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance," Wicklund and Brehm (1976) try to answer the question: 'After hundreds of empirical tests by innumerable researchers, aftrer numerous criticisms of the theory and the methods used to test it, and after various alternative theories have been proposed, what is the status of dissonance theory?' (source 8). The researchers take a comprehensive look at CDT research to answer this question. Two areas of research covered by Wicklund and Brehem are of particular importance to the premise of this paper. They are physiological arousal and drive states induced by cognitive dissonance. Wicklund and Brehm cite one study by Gerard (1967) wherein a link between CDT and physiological arousal is established. Motivational drive tests and CDT were linked in studies by Adams (1963), Ferdinand (1965) and Weick and Prestholdt (1968) (source 8).