Teaching Creativity
by
Nathan Huey, B.S.
Professional Report
Presented to the Faculty of
the Graduate School
of The University of Texas
at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts
The University of Texas at
Austin
May, 2000
Teaching Creativity
APPROVED BY
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:
Supervisor _____________________________
Patricia A. Alvey
_____________________________
John D. Leckenby
Table of Contents
Introduction.... 1
Texas Creative program........... 4
Definition of Creativity........ 6
Problems with "novelty" and "appropriateness"................ 7
Novelty.. 7
Judgment 7
Creativity as a Cognitive Process......... 10
Creative Intelligence 11
Quality
of Intelligence, not quantity 12
Intelligence
in problem choice, definition and redefinition............. 13
Role
of Intelligence in the Texas Creative program 15
Knowledge 16
Not
too much information, please 18
Knowledge
in the Texas Creative program 19
Intellectual Style........... 20
Adaption-Innovation............. 20
Mental
Self-government............. 21
Intellectual
Styles in the Texas Creative program 22
Creative Personality 23
The
Personality of Texas Creatives............. 27
Motivation 28
Motivation
of Texas Creatives............. 29
Environment 30
The
Environment of the Texas Creative program 31
Techniques for Creativity...... 33
Training the Resources. 33
Reward...... 34
Reward
in the Texas Creative program 38
Examples... 39
Examples
in the Texas Creative program 41
Brainstorming.................... 42
Brainstorming
in the Texas Creative program 44
Associated skills........... 46
Conclusion... 48
Works Cited 51
VITA.............. 60
Probably the three most overheard comments at any Superbowl party are, "I get my seat back," "That sells beer?" and, "How did they come up with that ad?" Creativity, it seems, defies common explanation. This relates to more than just Superbowl commercials; when it comes to art, music, science and technology, or, in this case, advertising, people are amazed by creative thought. Amazed by it, and envious of it, too, as there seem to be creative haves and creative have-nots. Some willingly embrace the fact that they aren't creative at all, others wish they were more so.
Probably the most accessible and
pervasive creative products in common culture today are 30-second television
commercials, 60-second radio spots, 4-color double page spreads, or towering
billboards. Creativity is often regarded as the most important aspect of the
industry (Otnes,
Oviatt, & Treise, 1995). Most people probably have no idea about the
functions of advertising professionals who don't create the ads. Creative
thought is so valuable in advertising, agencies' entire business structures are sometimes
designed around the talents of just one creative genius (Cummings, 1984).
As the advertising industry has
grown and become increasingly complex, preparing individuals for careers in
this demanding business became more complex as well. Some of the skills needed
for advertising mirror those for most businesses: presentation skills, client relations,
conceptual skills, speedy execution of ideas, and strategic thinking (Robbs,
1996). But these topics do not capture the creative spark that invented
Hershey's chocolate cow that makes chocolate milk, or a Spanish-speaking
Chihuahua that hawks tacos. Gone are the days that advertising agencies will
take anyone with writing skills or artistic abilities and turn them into copywriters
or art directors. Less on-the-job training (Robbs, 1996) means entry-level
creative advertising professionals need to be up to a speed where they can hit
the ground running. Running fast, in fact, as desktop publishing, imaging and
printing technology enables production of near-professional quality work with,
compared to the past, little effort or training - agencies' have much higher
expectations of junior employees (Otnes, Oviatt & Treise, 1995).
The responsibility falls on advertising education programs to teach aspiring advertising creatives how to harness their creative energies. With technology, stock photography and improved digital printing helping student portfolios look more professional, a student's ability to think creatively and strategically becomes possibly their greatest competitive advantage. Dedicating a specific creative track within an advertising program allows students to focus on these skills in order to give them more opportunities to develop the abilities which agencies seek. Portfolio finishing schools such as Portfolio Center and Creative Circus in Atlanta, Georgia (Deckinger, Brink, Katzenstein, & Primavera, 1989; Otnes, Oviatt, & Treise, 1995) the Miami Ad School, and creative advertising programs at the University of Texas at Austin and Virginia Commonwealth University have done just that.
But
can creativity really be taught? Or can creative individuals be trained to make
advertising? Many consider creativity an innate ability, creative
individuals mere mortal vessels to be filled with spiritual inspiration
(Sternberg & Lubart 1996). But as academics strive to better understand "the creative spark
which drives much of advertising" (Zinkham, 1993) the resulting research and
theory supports that creativity can indeed be trained, and guides creative
advertising programs in promising directions.
This report reviews established theories of
creativity, the components of creative thought, and the use of particular
creativity training methods. In addition to published research, the author
includes experiences in the University of Texas' Department of Advertising's
creative program to provide concrete examples of the presented principles.[1]
The University of Texas at Austin's Department of Advertising's creative program trains both undergraduate and graduate students as copywriters and art directors, specifically preparing for careers in advertising. Students must apply to participate in the program by answering a creative question. That question is typically ambiguous and open to interpretation, allowing for a wide variety of appropriate responses. For example, in the past the application has asked, "What is the distance?", "What makes sense?", and "What is courage?" Answers to the question remain anonymous when judged. Undergraduate applicants must be advertising students in good standing, with a grade point average of 2.25 or higher. Graduate student applicants also must be enrolled in the Advertising program with a grade point average of at least 3.0.
The program consists of three levels of portfolio courses. Each level requires students to produce a semester portfolio of print advertisements, with a final, polished portfolio and a well-rounded creative, strategic advertising brain the goal of the entire program. Directed by the instructor, students develop campaigns throughout the semester that are evaluated for a grade at an end of semester critique by members of the program faculty and advertising professionals. Progression through the program is based on the instructor's and professionals' judgments of the progress a student makes throughout their current level. If students are not ready to advance, they are presented with the option of repeating that level.
Student work at Texas is
predominately in printed media, as it is in most other advertising programs
nationwide. Production of broadcast media requires large amounts of time,
money, and equipment, resources that the students and program have in short
supply. But practitioners tend to appreciate student's work in print
advertisements, because the medium requires the concept and message to be
communicated clearly and concisely (Robbs, 1996).
People find it difficult to define
creativity. Much like the Supreme Justice who attempted to legally define
pornography, for the most part, people know creativity when they see it. Many
expect creativity to involve the conception of something entirely new (Fleenor,
Myers and McCaulley, 1985). Others think that adapting, improving, advancing or
finding a new application for an existing process or product qualifies as
creative behavior (Kirton, 1976, 1987). Or creativity could merely be original
ways to reach goals when the means to do so are not readily apparent (Brophy,
1998).
Through much debate, researchers
conclude that, at its simplest, creativity is the ability to produce work that
is both novel (original, unexpected, and divergent) and appropriate (useful, meets
task constraints) (Guilford, 1967; Lubart, 1994; Ochse, 1990; Sternberg, 1988b;
Sternberg & Lubart, 1991, 1995). From there, though, the definition gets
cloudy as more distinctions are added. Amabile (1982a), Jackson & Messick
(1965), MacKinnon (1962), and Sternberg (1985a, 1988a) forward that creative
work also must be of high quality. Barron (1963) measures creativity as a
combination of originality, complexity of outlook, and independence of
judgment. Still others include that creativity is marked by the production of a
high volume of ideas or products (Fleenor & Taylor, 1994, Simonton, 1988,
1997).
The appropriateness of reducing creativity to two, measurable dimensions remains undecided. Creativity as a confluence of novelty and appropriateness can be found in the daily lives (Sternbeg & Lubart, 1991) of most people (Kirton, 1976). But does this non-eminent, "little 'c'" creativity directly relate to "big 'C'", eminent creativity (Sternberg & Lubart, 1996)? It seems to many that the creativity needed to make random word associations might differ greatly from the creativity needed to paint the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel.
The so-called fundamentals of
creativity, "novel" and "appropriate," are not so clear themselves. Novelty is
difficult to measure. Most researchers operationalize novelty as divergence
from a norm (Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996; Sternberg & Lubart, 1996).
Yet, using statistical divergence from a mean is only one means of measuring
novelty (Sternberg & Lubart, 1996). Other means, however, remain
problematic as well. Attempts to use fluency, flexibility, originality and
elaboration as proxies or predictors of novelty fail to capture the concept of
creativity (Amabile, 1983).
Furthermore, if novel behavior must
meet a standard of quality or utility (Maltzman 1960, guilford 1968, Shalley
1991, Wallach & Kogan 1965, Winston and Baker 1985), and a product is
creative because appropriate judges collectively agree on this evaluation
(Amabile 1982a), who are these appropriate judges of quality or utility? Some
argue originality's usefulness must be recognized by society (Meyer and Roark
1989a), since the creative product is presented to the world for evaluation and
consumption (Feldhusen, 1995). Maltzman (1960) argues that social judgment
actually transforms originality into creativity, that original thought must be
expressed and judged in order to become creativity. Society's omission or
ignorance of an idea can arrest the development of originality into creativity;
if an individual's creative output is overlooked or disregarded, it misses the
judgment essential to being considered truly creative (Maltzman, 1960).
In this way, creativity is not in
the individual but in the social system (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). Social and
cultural factors affect all parts of the creative system and are particularly
influential to defining the individual's concept of creativity (Harrington,
1990; Holland, 1985; Labouvie-Vief, 1994; Nochlin, 1971; Wittkower and
Wittkower, 1963). The judgment of original thought is not permanent. "What was
once success may become failure and what was once ignored may later become
belatedly acclaimed (Simonton, 1997)." It may take much time for society at
large to see the value of a creative product (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991).
Indeed, society at large might be too vast a domain to serve as a fair judge of creativity. Some consider only what impacts a discipline as creative (Simonton, 1997), even though it might not excite or impress others outside that discipline. "Creativity evaluation is subjective, so the value of ideas will vary from one environment to another" (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Then it would be less than fair to use an artist's evaluation to decide the creative merit of a scientist's efforts. "Of course, peoples' definitions of creativity can vary somewhat from . . . one field to another" (Sternberg 1996). Art professors have been shown to emphasize imagination and originality, as well as an abundance of and willingness to try out new ideas. Philosophy professors focus on the ability to toy imaginatively with notions and combinations of ideas, as well as being able to devise classification schemes and systems. Physics professors emphasize inventiveness, the ability to organize chaos and the willingness to challenge fundamental principles (Sternberg, 1985b). A judge must be informed and familiar with a domain to know whether a creation is original to or aptly suited for that domain. They will know "where things are, what has been done, and what needs to be done" (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Thus, only judges from the field that the creator works in should evaluate and select new ideas to preserve and transmit to other individuals and generations (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988).
The former definition of creativity
really only designates what determines if an idea or product is creative. A
better understanding of creativity comes through investigating the cognitive
constructs and processes that are involved in creative behavior. Certain
cognitive traits characterize creative people (Amabile, 1983; Barron, 1968, 1969;
Eysenck, 1993; Gough, 1979; MacKinnon, 1965). In fact, samples of creative
individuals of varying age and occupation share common characteristics (Barron,
1965; Cattell and Butcher, 1970). Laypersons explain that creative people:
· connect ideas
· see similarities
and differences between things
· have flexibility
· possess aesthetic
taste
· are unorthdox
· are motivated
· are inquisitive
· question societal
norms
(Sternberg,
1985b)
Researchers show that these traits mark creative individuals, and that multiple components must converge for creativity to occur (Amabile, 1983; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Feldhusen & Goh, 1995; Gardner, 1993; Gruber, 1989; Lubart, 1994; MacKinnon, 1960, 1962; Mumford and Gustafson, 1988; Perkins, 1981; Simonton, 1988; Sternberg, 1985a; Sternberg & Lubart, 1991, 1995; Weisberg, 1993; Woodman & Schoenfeldt, 1989). Sternberg and Lubart (1991) developed a theory of creativity that classifies the interacting cognitive traits into categories of creative resources: intelligence, knowledge, intellectual style, personality, motivation, and environment. Most other models can be integrated into this "knitted" theory, giving insight to the interactions of the cognitive traits.
Creative people get accused of being
intelligent; the study of creativity began, somewhat, with the study of genius
(Becker, 1995; Isaksen & Murdock 1993). Elementary school students that
teachers and faculty members describe as creative are also described as
intelligent (Rossman & Gollob, 1975). This overlap continues between
creativity and good speaking skills, good writing skills, originality (Holland,
1959), and high grades in school (Wallen & Stevens, 1960). There is some
question to the objectivity of this correlation, or if a "halo" effect
surrounds creativity, wherein observers mesh creativity, intelligence and what
they think intelligence entails together into one trait and place it on people
who show original behavior (Bachelor, 1989).
Indeed, tests designed to measure intelligence
that are used frequently for psychological assessment and in education and
industry have been proven to predict a range of traits (Ghiselli, 1973; Hunter,
1986). Intelligence, however, appears to be a poor predictor of creativity.
Despite intuitive and anecdotal evidence, intelligence and creativity in
experimental contexts correlate modestly. At best, only average intelligence is
necessary as a resource for creative behavior (Barron & Harrington, 1981;
Guilford, 1979; Sternberg, 1985; Sternberg & Lubart, 1996 Wallach &
Wing, 1969). Meyer (1991) concludes that creative behavior is a learned pattern
of habits and attitudes, not IQ or a basic ability or aptitude, and that, with
training, an individual can reach creative achievement from most any aptitude
level. Moreover, people inclined to think convergently - which associates with
unoriginal behavior - perform better on IQ tests (Gardner, 1985; Sternberg, 1985)
since success on these tests requires convergence to the "right" answers.
So the quantity of intelligence might not
matter, but the quality of intelligence certainly does. Creative individuals
possess the ability to make remote associations: connections between unrelated
ideas or objects (Mednick, 1962). These connections require the concurrent
processing of ideas. Appropriately, then, the highest performers on remote
associations tests also have the widest spans of attention and show that they
simultaneously think along multiple lines (Kasperson, 1978). Creatives also
show fluid and insightful reasoning abilities by moving ideas from common into
unique systems of thinking (Sternberg, 1982). They easily form analogies
between old and new ideas, including ideas from in and outside the domain in
which they are working (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Analogy building
combines their divergent thinking skills with selective comparison to choose
particular concepts to collate (Guilford, 1967). In deeper terms, they regress
or access preconscious, primary-process thinking and synthesize it with
conscious, secondary process thought (Arieti, 1976, Kris, 1952, Kube, 1958,
Maslow, 1968 Suler, 1980 Mednick, 1962 Findlay & Lumsden, 1988). Creative
individuals show visualization skills, the power and will to escape established
perceptual sets, and flexible decision-making (Tardif & Sternberg, 1988).
Note that the described processes actually
include divergent and convergent thought. Analogy building takes divergent
ideas and converges them into one. Recall the role of social judgment in
assessing the appropriateness of creative work. The work must converge with
some guidelines the judges will use to determine its usefulness. Creative problem
solving abuts divergent thinking and convergent evaluation, requiring the
ability to judge when each is appropriate (Murdock & Pussic, 1993, Noppe,
1996, Runco & Chad, 1995). Rotating through divergent and convergent
thinking evinces an advanced stage of cognitive development (Brophy, 1998). For
creative thinking, an ideal balance between "the competence, problem solving
and convergent thinking on one hand" and "independent knowledge, problem
finding and divergent thinking" (Moneta, 1993) on the other, should be struck.
This explains, in part, the overlap of IQ tests, earlier presented as a test
suited for convergent thinkers, and creativity assessments. Creative
individuals might shift into convergent thought while taking such tests.
The alternation
between convergent and divergent thinking shows strongly in how creative
individuals choose, define, and solve problems, tasks, or projects. Truly,
"finding potential avenues for creativity is nontrivial" (Sternbegr &
Lubart, 1991). Creative individuals tend to recognize and focus on the good
problems in a field (Tardif & Sternberg, 1988), perhaps seeing divergent
opportunities for solutions where others do not. Wise choices of problems and
solutions have been reported in many biographies of artists and scientists
(Henle, 1975); the most eminent artists exhibit taste in their choice of
problems for visual expression (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976).
Good problems are not easily found - they are
created. Since most problems are unstructured and unpredictable with ambiguous
goals, understanding and defining the problem proves more difficult than
solving it. (Basadur, 1987). Instead, sensing vague or illogical problems leads
individuals to create new problem definitions (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992).
Individuals generate many more answers after recasting problems into broad
terms applied directly to their expertise (Volkema, 1983). Or if the problem is
clear, but apparent solutions seem hackneyed, by selectively encoding certain
problem traits, and making insightful comparison and selective combinations,
individuals can view old problems in a new light (Davidson & Sternberg,
1984, Sternberg & Davidson, 1982). Strong analogies can also transform problems
by introducing knowledge, meaning and procedures from one field into another
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). This redefinition highlights the interplay of
divergent and convergent thought in the creative process, as creative
individuals must think divergently to associate remote ideas with a
problem-task and then converge those ideas into a new category to develop a
creative solution.
Forming these new categories lies at the heart
of creative intelligence. Creative individuals naturally organize information
into categories or systems of information with the intent to generate new
solutions to the problem (Mumford, Costanza, Threlfal, Baughman &
Reiter-Palmon, 1993). As their experience changes they will adjust those
categories to reflect the broadened experience (Carnes & Kirton, 1982,
Kirton, 1976, 1978a, 1985). Impulsively using established categories leads
individuals to ignore less obvious cues, strategies and potential solutions to
a problem, task or project (Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, & Redmond, 1994),
resulting in lower creativity. Thus, creativity flourishes when individuals do
not believe in "one right answer" (Adams 1974, 1986, von Oech, 1983). They can
then escape perceptual sets, and question norms (Tardif & Sternberg, 1988).
It makes sense, then, that researchers were most creative when they could decide how to work problems (Amabile, 1987), that "successful" and "original" artists spent more time formulating their art compositions (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976) - creativity requires the freedom and time to develop new, application-specific systems and categories. People best able to construct problems produce the most original and high quality solutions (Reiter-Palmon, Mumford, Boes & Runco, 1997). By helping creatives improve their problem defining skills, creative behavior can be enhanced.
Although candidates for the Texas Creative program must be students in good standing with certain grade point averages, the standard for such status might seem less than rigorous to some. That and the neglect of candidates' SAT/ACT/GRE scores, as far as they might be considered measures of intelligence, in the Texas Creative program application process supports that high intelligence might not be necessary for creativity. In fact, some students with average or lower performance in general academic courses excel in the creative courses. This might be simple lack of interest in other subjects, or it can represent a difference in aptitudes.
When working on a new campaign, students often will develop a creative brief, which could be considered their problem definition. The format of these briefs varies from student to student and often from project to project. Students floundering for good advertising concepts often need to go back and rework their creative brief to better define and understand their problem. Frequently little effort goes into creative brief development. It might be a low priority for the creative students and seen as an uncreative, even convergent task. However, students in the program and professionals in the industry have expressed that nothing gives them more freedom than a tightly written creative brief. Perhaps designing exercises that encourage divergent thinking in developing creative briefs would increase time spent in this problem development phase, and lead to higher levels of creativity.
For intelligence to be useful, the creative mind
must have information to process. The ingestion and digestion of information
(Young, 1960) is necessary so that the individual has data to organize and
rearrange into new patterns (Carnes & Kirton 1982, Kirton 1976, 1978a,
1985). Selecting what information to encode makes a large difference in the
generation of creative solutions (Davidson & Sternberg, 1984; Sternberg
& Davidson, 1982). The most creative individuals tend to be intellectually
curious, seek out more information to work with, are open to experience, and
display a wide breadth of interests (MacKinnon, 1962).
So for creativity, as one advertising creative
explained, an individual should "get a lot of information" (Otnes, Oviatt,
& Treise, 1995). Broadening knowledge increases an individual's associative
network by adding more possibilities for permutations and combinations of ideas
(Mednick, 1962). As mentioned before, the highest performers on remote
associations tests show the widest span of attention, collecting information
from multiple sources (Kasperson, 1978). This learning might not be directed at
the task at hand, in fact, information that appears to the learner to be
unrelated to the task often becomes a crucial element in the creative solution
(Bahrick, Fitts & Rankin, 1952; Johnson & Thomson, 1962; McNamara &
Fisch, 1964). Creative problem solvers need to have wide enough expanses of knowledge
to generate and "identify useful chance combinations that lead to solutions and
change current solutions into alternate products or procedures" (Brophy, 1998).
The most creative scientists gather information from a wide rangeof sources and
fields (Mendelsohn, 1976). Scientists with expert knowledge use more analogies
and evince the resilient ability to use unpredicted, surprising results in
experiments to narrow down options and develop new questions (Brophy, 1998).
Beyond just information, creative individuals need knowledge of "heuristics for
generating novel ideas such as trying a counterintuitive approach" (Amabile
1983a,b). Knowing "how one can go about creating what is needed and how one's
ideas will be perceived" is as important as knowing "where things are, what has
been done, and what needs to be done" in a field (Sternberg & Lubart,
1991).
Thus, it is important that while obtaining
information, creative individuals do not treat domains of knowledge as discrete
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1991), and approach learning with an awareness that
what can be learned can also be transformed (Pickard, 1990). Thinking that is
flexible and draws from assorted category types predicts creativity better than
fluency or originality ratings (Runco, 1991a). Better creative thought comes
after asking questions about evaluation, synthesis and application of ideas
rather than just about facts (Glover, 1979).
But too much information can restrain creativity. Experts in certain fields are not often the most creative in the field (Sternberg & Lubart 1991). Creativity might increase with knowledge to a point, and then falls off, the function tracing an inverted "u" (Simonton, 1984). Expertise often blinds people to new ideas unless expert knowledge is stored in broad categories that can promote new associations (Amabile, 1990; Martinsen 1993). Experts are more likely to reflexively use pre-packaged ideas routines and procedures, neglecting the environment and miss subtle cues for potential strategies (Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, & Redmond, 1994, Sternberg & Frensch, 1989). Diffuse associations allow better remote associations; expertise brings finer distinction to ideas and concepts, narrowing possible associations (Mednick, 1962).
As regular students in the advertising department and the university, program participants are subject to course requirements outside of the program. This requires the students to learn other topics and pursue other interests outside of advertising, which can only lead to the earlier discussed breadth of knowledge and experience. This might be seen as an advantage over portfolio finishing schools that only offer training specific to advertising. It also requires students to take advertising course and learn advertising specific skills, like campaign strategy, that are essential to the creative program, allowing the program to expect students already have that knowledge.
Advertising professionals contend that courses outside the traditional advertising curricula are essential to advertising professionals in their careers. They particularly encourage students to take courses in English, economics, film, journalism, art history, and "seasoned creatives clearly placed more value on psychology courses." One professional advises, "Acquire whatever breadth you can find, whether it's working on a fishing boat, climbing mountains or visiting old folk's homes . . . the broader you can be the more stuff you'll have to draw from as a creative person." (Otnes, Oviatt, & Treise, 1995)
At the end of a semester or after a deadline for student advertising competitions, the program students are often encouraged to take a break from advertising. They are encouraged instead to go to museums, read books, see movies, go hiking, and do pretty much anything other than sit and think of ways to sell products. After these breaks students not only return with fresh energy but with brighter ideas.
Intellectual style is an individual's
inclination for using their abilities in a certain manner (Kogan, 1973). It is
not creative ability itself, but it may be what distinguishes, pedestrian,
little "c" creativity found in our daily lives (Sternbegr & Lubart, 1991)
from the more romantic, big "C" creativity. In this case "salespersons, stock
clerks and managers" can be as creative as artists and scientists (Amabile,
1997), only with different intellectual styles of creativity.
Kirton (1976) explains creativity
comes in two flavors, adaptive and innovative. These styles are independent of
creative ability; adaptors and innovators show equal levels of creativity
(Kirton, 1976, 1987). Adaptors make adjustments or incremental modifications to
ideas and concepts while maintaining their basic structures. Innovators, on the
other hand, are motivated to create new ideas, make new discoveries.
Innovators match the general idea of creativity.
They are the artists and freethinkers. Innovators seek sensation, take risks,
and do not subscribe to dogmatism (Goldsmith, 1984; Torrance & Horng,
1980). They have higher confidence in their abilities and see themselves as
creators (Kirton, 1989). They might produce a greater quantity of output than
the adaptors, but this difference comes from their style of experimenting with
and revising subsequent expressions of ideas, not from higher creative ability
(Kirton, 1987).
But adaptors are just as creative and can
produce work that fits the earlier definition of creativity just as well, and
in some cases, better than, innovators. Innovators adapt, improve, advance, or
find new applications for an existing process or product (Kirton, 1989). They
modify old constructs in novel ways (Ward, 1994), form remote associations that
lead to creative solutions, and change current solutions into new products or
procedures (Brophy, 1998). Adaptors work in groups better, because they are
able to accept and modify others systems of thinking (Feldman, 1988). This
allows a sharing of ideas and leads to a greater knowledge base for remote
associations. The effects of minor adaptations can have monumental creative
effects, as small changes to many elements can cause exponential changes when
those elements are brought together to form one idea. Adaptor's intimacy with
what has been done before in a field increases the probability that their
solutions will be appropriate and appreciated.
Sternberg (1988b) provides three intellectual
styles, describing modes of mental self-government: legislative, executive, and
judicial. Legislative thinkers develop their own rules, procedures and ideas.
Executive thinkers use existing rules they accept as conventional and effective
ways of thinking. Judicial thinkers evaluate the other two style's activities.
Sternberg & Lubart (1991) enhance these three styles by adding that they
can operate in a either a global or local manner. Global thinking deals with
large, broad issues of a problem, whereas local thinking applies to smaller and
narrower details of tasks. Individuals that choose global projects are more
likely to be seen and heralded as creative.
Recall from the discussion of intelligence the
dually divergent and convergent nature of creativity. The creative process
needs periods of divergent thinking and convergent evaluation and the ability
to judge when each is appropriate (Murdock & Pussic, 1993; Noppe, 1996;
Runco & Chad, 1995). In that case, one creative person could show adaptive
and innovative styles. An innovator might balance divergent ideation with
convergent evaluation (Brophy, 1998). Their innovative behavior shows
adaptation, as they revise ideas in search of a final product that meets some
standard, either intrinsic or extrinsic, of acceptance; "mosts artists seek the
best ways to work within the limits of their resources and chosen media"
(Brophy, 1998). This precludes neither that the majority of people show a
propensity for adapting or innovating as well as higher proficiency at their
preferred mode, nor that certain people are more inclined and able to handle problems
with particular natures and processing attributes (Brophy, 1998). But as there
should be some an optimal balance between convergent and divergent thinking
(Moneta, 1993), further research should focus on whether the ability to switch
between styles is innate, learned, or both.
Varying intellectual styles can be seen throughout the program. Student work often shows adaptive styles, as in the incorporation of other art genres such as movie posters or military propaganda into print advertisements. They adapt old product strategies with new selling concepts, extending the identity of a brand or campaign.
Students also strive to push the advertising envelope by producing advertisements with innovative styles and design elements. Adaption of the aforementioned genres shows innovation, as their inclusion is fresh and new to advertising. At a recent, end of the semester critique, a judge remarked that he applauded the efforts to produce ads that did not look like ads.
Students would likely benefit from understanding and identifying their propensity towards adaption or innovation. Brophy (1998) notes that possible problem-person matches can help individuals perform more creatively. Or, especially since a major goal of the program is to produce student portfolios that will help land agency jobs and agencies appreciate diversity (Otnes, Oviatt, & Treise, 1995), students might like to monitor their projects to be sure they show both innovative and adaptive abilities. Students who are aware of their tendency to adapt might focus effort on the points of adaption to distinguish their new effort from the ideas being adapted, whereas innovators might allow themselves more free thinking.
Particular personality traits tend
to identify creative individuals (Amabile, 1983; Barron, 1968, 1969; Eysenck,
1993; Gough, 1979; MacKinnon, 1965; Meyer, 1991). Creatives tend to be
attracted to rather than afraid of complex problems (Barron & Harrington,
1981; Helson, Roberts & Agronick, 1995). They have a need for some system
of order in their environment (Barron, 1963) and themselves (Helson, 1996;
Schneiderman, 1984; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988). They are oriented towards
aesthetics (Barron & Harrington, 1981). They desire intellectual novelty (Berg &
Sternberg, 1985; Bornstein & Sigman, 1986) with an intrinsic desire to be
creative (Brophy, 1998).
They seek power and show
opportunism (Helson, 1996; Schneiderman, 1984; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988),
their ambition coming from a compelling need for achievement (McClelland,
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) and restlessness (Otnes, Oviatt, &
Treise, 1995). The restlessness and ambitious urges mark their behavior with
some manic-depressive patterns (Jamison, 1993). They feel imbued with and
recognize a sense of power or capacity to transform (Feldhusen, 1995; Kirton,
1987; Pickard, 1990). They are addicted to a "flow" of energy, which
presents major gratification in their creative work (Csikszentmihlayi, 1988a).
They show great intellectual
curiosity, (MacKinnon, 1960). Their openness to experiences and information and
willingness to grow are not suppressed or repressed (MacKinnon, 1962; McCrae,
1987). Likewise, they are uninterested in policing their own impulses or
impulses of others (MacKinnon, 1965) and show great perceptiveness,
receptiveness and deliberateness (Moriarty & Vanden Bergh, 1984).
Creative excellence comes with a
high work ethic. Creative individuals show concentrated effort (Amabile,
1983a,b), persistence (Helson, Roberts & Agronick, 1995; Otnes, Oviatt,
& Treise, 1995), high levels of energy in their work (Helson, 1996;
MacKinnon, 1960; Schneiderman, 1984; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988), and
commitment to the creative endeavor (Helson, Roberts & Agronick, 1995; White, 1959).
This all leads to high levels of work absorption (Helson, 1996; Schneiderman,
1984; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988), high aspirations, (Helson, Roberts &
Agronick, 1995), and an excessive willingness to surmount obstacles and
persevere (Golann, 1963). Creatives express a sense of continual career
building and efficacy for choosing their work and controlling their career path
(Helson, Roberts & Agronick, 1995).
High levels of self-confidence
relate to this persistence. The confidence comes, at least in part, from great
pride in their unique and distinctive behavior (Barron & Harrington 1981;
Dellas & Gaier, 1970; Golann, 1963; MacKinnon, 1962, 1965; Sternberg &
Lubart, 1991). It often is blended with self-criticism (Helson, 1996;
Schneiderman, 1984; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988). It manifests in
assertiveness, (MacKinnon, 1962), a desire for autonomy (Brophy, 1998),
independence of work (Amabile, 1983a,b, Helson, 1996; Schneiderman, 1984;
Tardif & Sternberg, 1988) and independence of judgment as creative individuals
believe in what they think and do (Barron & Harrington 1981; Dellas &
Gaier, 1970; Golann, 1963; MacKinnon, 1962, 1965). The confidence is usually
well placed; innovators are more self-perceptive (Kirton, 1987), and
independence and good self-image predict good problem finding (Smilansky &
Halberstadt, 1986).
Creative confidence wells from an
internal locus of evaluation (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Disinterested in
policing their own impulses or impulses of others (MacKinnon, 1962), creatives
don't care for others policing their impulses, either. Children who regulate
themselves and their environment score higher on creative thinking tests
(Carson, Bittner, Cameron, Brown & Meyer, 1994). Central mood regulation
and high self-esteem leads to levels of narcissism (Wink, 1991), but not
necessarily arrogance. Rather than thinking they are better than everyone else,
creatives often do not pay much attention to anyone else. Consequently, an internal locus of
evaluation (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991) and control helps creatives to
better withstand external evaluation while it decreases creativity in people
showing average creativity (Klebba & Tierney, 1995).
Being able to endure external
evaluation enables creative individuals to take risks in what they think and
do. In general, creative individuals tend to take great risks and seek
sensation (Goldsmith, 1984; Kirton, 1987; Torrance & Horng, 1980). When
people feel threatened by unfavorable reviews of their performance, they show
significantly low levels of risk-taking and subsequently lower levels of
creativity (Amabile, 1985). Risky behavior includes choosing unorthodox or
unproven solutions and processes, instead of relying on strategies that have
worked in the past (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). People willing to take more
risks also show higher flexibility and originality in their thinking (Barron
& Harrington, 1981; Glover & Sautter, 1977; McClelland, 1956).
A high tolerance of ambiguity
accompanies creativity (Barron & Harrington 1981; Carson, Bittner, Cameron,
Brown & Meyer, 1994; Golann, 1963). Besides persisting through them,
creative individuals show the ability to set problems aside (Amabile, 1983a,b).
They often refuse to review decisions, and in turn evade premature closure
(Janis & Mann, 1977). This requires confronting and living with cognitive
discomfort rather than withdrawing from a problem until its solution is found
(Brophy, 1968a; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). Tolerating ambiguity allows
solutions to develop through serial iterations or ideations; "analyzing them
and integrating them takes time" (McCarthy, 1993; Sternberg, 1988). Impulsive
and premature conclusions result in inadequate (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991)
or less creative solutions, since greater divergency is found towards the end
of ideational strings (Eisenberger & Selbst, 1994; Wallach, 1988). The
tolerance of ambiguity may be considered a confluence of the above traits,
particularly persistence and confidence. The more confident an individual is
that they can and will resolve a cognitive conflict, the better able they are
to tolerate that conflict (Sheldon, 1995a).
Elements of the described creative personality can be found in varying strength throughout the participants. Most evident is the strong work ethic and commitment to the creative endeavor; many students become computer "lab rats", ignoring other subjects and spending excessive hours in the computer studio used to produce their work. Confidence pervades the group, as does acceptance of evaluation. Many ask for their peers' brutal judgment.
Invited and uninvited criticism
strengthens the students. It can discourage many, and sounds harsh to
outsiders. But if they can not withstand such analysis, they probably do not
belong in a business where "external evaluation is invited throughout and is inherent to the
development of strategy and message" (Klebba & Tierney, 1995). Students
should learn to weather criticism and look for the constructive information it
might provide. Those that develop immunity to having their ideas roughly
criticized will likely be the successful members of a creative staff (Klebba
& Tierney, 1995).
Students in the program also learn to tolerate
ambiguity. Some begin the program needing constant guidance from the
instructors. They leave class remarking that they know they haven't reached the
solution, but have no idea what they are supposed to do next with a project.
Although they might doubt it, the instructor is actually helping by not
explaining exactly what comes next, because there usually is no correct next
step. Over time students learn to appreciate this and the freedom that comes
from knowing that success can be found in a number of different directions.
The personality resource and
motivation systems are closely integrated (Helson, Roberts & Agronick,
1995). The
creative personality desires to achieve excellence (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark
& Lowell, 1953) and actualize one's potential (Golann, 1962), which,
combined with persistence and a high level of energy for work (MacKinnon,
1960), provides powerful motivation. Motivation is a significant factor in
creative accomplishment (Amabile, 1983a,b); strength and endurance of
motivation drives the intense practice necessary for expert performance
(Helson, Roberts & Agronick, 1995).
Intrinsic motivators that well from within the
creative individual, such as achievement of one's potential (Amabile, 1983b;
Crutchfield, 1962; Golaann, 1962), assist creativity better than most extrinsic
motivation. The key, however, is not in the locus of motivation, but the
individual's direction of focus. Motivation that orients an individual to focus
on the task rather than the goal boosts creative performance (Mehr &
Shaver, 1996). Creative individuals often set goals of self or process development,
whereas less-creative individuals usually set goals on the final product (Mehr
& Shaver 1996). Following intrinsic motivation typically leads to a
task-focus because intrinsic motivators are integrated with task completion and
less salient (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Motivation salience should remain
low, because too much focus on any outcome, whether an intrinsic or extrinsic
goal, will be detrimental to creativity (Simon, 1967). Narrow attention to
goals reduces the spontaneity and flexibility of performance that results from
high task involvement (McGraw, 1978; Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). The
creative personality's tendency to absorb themselves in work leads to a focus
on working, not on the outcome (Helson, 1996; Schneiderman, 1984; Tardif &
Sternberg, 1988).
The importance of task-focused motivation can be seen towards the end of a semester. As the semester progresses, attention tends to centralize on having the requisite number of ads for the end of semester critique, definitely a goal focus. To this end, students will revive old campaigns they have worked on in previous semesters or, if they do create new work at the last minute, it frequently shows lower creative effort.
Creativity flourishes in the right environment
(Krober, 1944; Simonton, 1994). Creative output can be linked to environmental
variables, including cultural diversity, war, availability of creative role
models, availability of resources (financial support) and the number of
competitors in a domain (Simonton, 1984, 1988, 1994). If the environment
rewards creative effort, creativity can become habitual (Davis, 1986). Creative
individuals need appropriate support and assistance to transform experiences
and knowledge (Pickard, 1990).
Just as easily as it nourishes creativity, an
environment can suppress creative behavior (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991).
Support given to individuals, and not given to others, for the development,
implementation and employment of new ideas or products influences the notions
of what kinds of original behavior are accepted (Harrington, 1990; Holland,
1985; Labouvie-Vief, 1994; Nochlin, 1971; Wittkower & Wittkower, 1963). As
discussed earlier, a product is creative only if appropriate judges agree on
this assessment (Amabile, 1982a). If judges and the environment do not approve
of or find use for a creative product, they will not be preserved and
transmitted to others (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). Judges' opinions depend on
their specific characteristics and the field of ideas competing for judgment,
so evaluation of creativity can vary from one environment to another. Meeting
judges' expectations and competition can force the creative mind to look from
everyone else's perspective (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991) and converge to it.
The quality of support an environment offers
creativity can matter as much as the quantity. Encouragement and freedom of
choice boosts creativity. Children show higher level of divergent thinking when
allowed to choose materials they used to make collages (Amabile & Gitomer,
1984). They score higher on creative thinking tests when given autonomy over
themselves and control of their environment (Carson, Bittner, Cameron, Brown
& Meyer, 1994). On the other hand, they show less creativity when internal
control is taken away and rules or external control are placed on their
activities (Koestner, Ryan, Bernieri, & Holt, 1984).
Interaction with and awareness of the environment advances creativity. Children show more ideational fluency when they are tested in a room full of objects they can see or touch than when tested in a bare room (Ward, 1969). And working in an environment containing other inventive people increases the likelihood that creative ideas will be sparked through interactions with those people (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991).
The program provides a rich and resource full environment. In terms of bricks and mortar, two rooms at the university are assigned to the program: a seminar for general class meetings and a computer studio for the execution of student work. The seminar room walls bear examples of professional creative print advertisements, translucent plastic mats on the tables cover student print ads, and corkboards line the rooms for students to hang their progressing work for others to see and comment on during class. The computer studio provides current computer hardware and software, and stock images for producing the work, more examples along the walls. A ceiling-mounted video projector assists teaching by displaying an instructor's computer screen on a large screen for showing computer techniques, or by exhibiting the program's large library of television advertising reels.
Beyond the physical aspects, the program provides an
open and free environment for students to work in. Students "own" the lab and
seminar. In the computer lab, they often have music playing from a stereo in
one corner or television or videotapes projected on the large screen. Students
have painted, repainted, and removed the ceiling tiles from the seminar room
wholly on their own initiative. This culminates in an atmosphere where
individuals feel free to express themselves, both creatively and critically.
Creativity grows, as individuals present ideas with confidence that good ideas
will have the support and resources to be developed and that bad ideas will be
identified and rejected.
When creativity is considered
magical or even just irregular, the suggestion that it can be taught or trained
seems odd. There is a logical contradiction inherent to trying to induce a
spontaneous event (Maltzman, 1960). It is difficult to train someone to
think in an unexpected manner because the outcome can not be known in advance (Pickard,
1990).
But as a confluence of the above six resources,
creativity can be trained through influencing any six of those components
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Teaching individuals to alternate between
divergent ideation and convergent evaluation (Brophy, 1991; Noppe 1996) can
develop creative intelligence. Knowledge can be increased through general
education, and specifically honed for creative behavior if students are lead to
assimilate knowledge in a holistic manner rather than discrete categories or
disciplines (Baughman & Mumford, 1995; Sternberg & Lubart, 1991), and
stored with the knowledge that what can be learned can be transformed (Pickard,
1990). Either an adaptive or innovative intellectual style will help creativity
(Kirton, 1987); identifying and understanding which style dominates an
individual's behavior might be advantageous to choosing tasks to match that
style (Brophy, 1998). Learning to conjoin disparate concepts leads to
significant increases in originality in free association exercises (Maltzman,
1960). Instilling self esteem and confidence will increase risk taking, and
allow greater tolerance of ambiguity, leading to higher creative output.
Motivation that focuses on tasks rather than goals will be more effective in
training creativity, as will learning to identify intrinsic rewards of task
accomplishment. Creativity is better fostered in a supportive, free and
populated environment.
Training these resources is easier said than done. For instance, individuals should not learn certain things. Individuals will be more creative if they do not learn there are wrong answers, that ambiguity is bad, and instead learn to identify and remove similar cognitive blocks to originality (Adamson, 1986; von Oech, 1983). Training in logical thought improves performance on intelligence tests, but inhibits the creation of analogies (Smolucha & Smolucha, 1985). Attempts to develop the creative resources could inadvertently squash creative behavior. Three features of training, the use of rewards, the use of examples, and brainstorming, emerge as strong methods for teaching creativity that become dangerous if used in the wrong ways.
General behavior theory suggests that divergent
thinking, and thus creativity, can be influenced enhanced or conditioned by
systematic reward, as can any cognitive response (Maltzman, 1960; Pryor, Haag
& O'reilly, 1969; Skinner, 1953; Torrance, 1970 Winston & Baker, 1985).
However, reward can be seen as an extrinsic motivator, and the negative effects
of extrinsic motivators have been made clear. Individuals working to receive a
reward might work harder and produce more output, but the activity exhibits
lower quality, contains more errors, and is more stereotyped than work produced
without reward (Condry, 1977). Rewarding nursery school children induces the
production of less interesting drawings (Lepper, Greene & Nisbett, 1973).
Reward becomes a distraction, preventing individuals from becoming fully
immersed in a project (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990a, McGraw & Mccullers, 1979),
and lowers creativity (McGraw, 1978; Condry & Chambers, 1978), as does
being watched while creating, expecting evaluation, receiving a praiseful
previous evaluation, contingent rewards and competing for prizes (Amabile,
1990; Hennessey & Amabile, 1988). Highly salient rewards are more
distracting, also leading to lower levels of divergent thought (Eisenberger
& Selbst, 1994; Hennessey & Amabile, 1988).
The negative effects of reward and creativity
seem logical, since classic conditioning models work by reinforcing the
repetition of behavior. Reinforcement produces not much of anything other than
stereotyped repetition of what works and generates the reward, teaching animals
and humans "to repeat precisely what has worked in the past" (Schwartz, 1982).
Individuals often believe there is only one right answer, and then confuse the
activity that was sufficient to
receive the reward as being essential for
receiving the reward (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). They rely on that single,
reinforced path to attain the goal of reward, and neglect other possible
activities, seeing no reason to divert from the rewarded activity
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990a, McGraw & Mccullers, 1979).
Besides distracting, reward can lessen an individual's desire to create. Dissonance theory states that by inducing people to participate in tasks in which they have no or little interest in without providing reward for their participation, those people will reconcile their involvement by reevaluating the task as inherently interesting (Festinger, 1957). Conversely, over-justifying an individual's participation in an activity they are interested in will lead them to reevaluate the task as less inherently interesting (Lepper, Greene & Nisbett, 1973). So while reinforcement contingencies strive to increase the probability of unlikely or infrequent behavior (Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Staats, 1975), creative personalities are already attracted to intellectual novelty (Berg & Sternberg, 1985; Bornstein & Sigman, 1986), and desire to actualize their creative potential (Golann, 1962) and achieve excellence (McClellan, Atkinson, Clark & Lowell, 1953). They need little more incentive. After being rewarded for doing these things they already would have done, "individuals will no longer engage in the task without the reward." (Lepper, Greene & Nisbett, 1978; Deci 1975). What was once play becomes work, and ends become means (Schwartz, 1982).
However, extrinsic motivators do not always
negate creative accomplishment (Amabile, 1988). The contingency of the reward
makes the difference. If reward is contingent on task performance, creativity
on the task is substantially lower than if the reward is received regardless of
the performance. The contingency leads individuals to focus on the goal and
then misdirects attention away from the task at hand (Amabile, 1982b; Amabile,
Hennessey, & Grossman., 1986; Balsam & Bondy, 1983; McGraw, 1978; Reiss
& Suchinsky, 1975, 1976; Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Individuals will
then overlook subtle environmental elements that might be used in achieving a
creative solution (Amabile, 1983, 1986) or exclude from their thinking
information that does not seem germane to the problem (Bahrick, Fitts &
Rankin, 1952; Johnson & Thomson, 1962; McNamara & Fisch, 1964).
Altogether, the spontaneity and flexibility of the creative performance that
would result from high task involvement disappears (McGraw, 1978; Sternberg
& Lubart, 1991).
Alternatively, unexpected reward that comes
after task performance does not lower creativity on future tasks (Amabile,
1987). What's more, excitingly original thinking can occur when such conditions
reward achievement (Torrance, 1965). Taking away the reward contingency, the
reward somehow becomes more instructional than motivational and reinforces the
process, not the outcome (Eisenberger & Selbst, 1994), leading to a desired
task-focus. This way, a creative atmosphere that rewards creativity can help it
become habitual (Davis, 1986) and increases future creativity or the
continuation of creative behavior (Glover, 1980; Glover & Gary, 1976; Goetz
& Baer, 1973; Funderbunk, 1977; Winston & Baker, 1985).
Reward influences creativity the strongest when
it is accompanied with feedback that links the reward to the process, not the
outcome (Eisenberger & Selbst, 1994). The instructive component characterizes
the reward as informative rather than controlling. The influence of reward then
becomes strongest when introduced during the preparation and implementation
stages of a creative process (Amabile, 1987).
So, if reward can effectively
reinforce divergent thought, attention must be paid to the level of divergent
thought that receives reward. Low-divergent thought can be reinforced,
producing more low divergent thought, a learned laziness (Reiss &
Sushinsky, 1975, 1976). On the contrary, rewarding high-divergent thought will
teach what dimensions of performance are rewarded and individuals will develop
the appropriate level of effort to meet the performance dimensions (Eisenberger
& Selbst, 1994). Thus, only a wise use of reward promotes creativity (Funderbaunk,
1977; Goetz, 1989).
Reward in the program has low salience. Considering high grades as reward, grades are not even mentioned in the two higher levels until the very end of the semester. In the beginning level, grading during the semester is coupled with the understanding that only the overall semester grade is final, thereby enhancing the informational properties of grades. Verbal praise in all levels tends to tie strongly to instructive comments, as in "putting this logo here helps with the processing order - good job", linking the reward to the behavior. And, probably less by design and more from just the nature of the beast, awards from advertising competitions are received so long after the creative activity that they less likely reinforce one solution and more likely lead to higher general confidence. Since there is no statistical analysis of the levels of student work's divergent thought, reliably remarking on whether or not the program reinforces low or high divergent thinking is impossible.
Quite
often, creativity is taught through exposing individuals to examples of
creativity. Advertising professionals recommend that an aspiring creative
should review awards annuals to know "what on earth [they] are shooting for"
(Otnes, Oviatt, & Treise, 1995). Composers must develop their musical
talent by practicing other composer's pieces (Weisberg, 1998) before writing
their own. Attending to examples gives problem solvers domain knowledge and
experience. Knowledge in a domain teaches creative individuals the rules and
resource limits they must work within (Brophy, 1998; Runco & Albert,
1993b). Knowing "where things are, what has been done, and what needs to be
done, how one can go about creating what is needed, and how one's ideas will be
perceived" (Sternbegr & Lubart, 1991) and what are the good problems in the
field (Tardif & Sternberg, 1988) advances creativity. Knowing what has
already been done can prevent reinvention (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991).
But using examples can lead to convergence. Task
solutions often incorporate elements from examples that the solver has seen
before. In this way, creative solutions are rarely ever wholly original, since
individuals typically build on or out of prior ideas (Marsh, Landau, &
Hicks, 1996), even when instructed not to (Smith, Ward, & Schumacher,
1993). This cryptomnesia is inadvertent plagiarism. Individuals truly believe
their derivative solutions are their own. (Brown & Murphy, 1989; Marsh
& Bower, 1993), especially when time has passed between exposure to the
exemplar and the creative task. (Brown & Halliday, 1991; Marsh & Bower,
1993; Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996). Examples become "activated
information", which is processed more fluently. The individual does not closely
monitor the source of the active information and incorporates it into the
creative task. The fluent information seems to come easier to the individual
who then attributes it to themselves, even when prompted to recall the example
(Marsh & Landau, 1995; Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993; Ward, 1994).
Creativity will be further constrained if the aspects of the example that are
incorporated are less than ideal (Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996) or if an
individual takes a misleading cue from an example and follows the wrong
solution path (Smith, 1985).
Exposure to examples leads individuals to
classify those examples in categories. Solutions to a creative task that seems
to belong in that category will often be solved with a pre-existing solution
from that category. These strategies that worked at one time might not work now
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). As more examples are provided, the category
structure becomes more developed and narrower, as does the definition of "what
constitutes an acceptable and novel addition to the category" (Marsh, Landau,
& Hicks, 1996). Then, individuals will have a more difficult time
developing solutions that fit into those categories. Plus, as more examples are
provided, the individuals' domain of examples becomes wider and the probability
that they will have access and sometimes use those previous ideas increases
(Ross, 1987).
As in the use of rewards, tying exposure to
examples with instruction can subvert the possible negative outcomes. Creative
individuals trained to identify, map, and elaborate the features of examples
resulted in original and higher quality category combinations (Baughman &
Mumford, 1995). Instructing creative individuals to store examples in broad
categories (Amabile, 1990; Martinsen, 1993) advances creative behavior.
Instruction can lead an individual to see an example as a representation of the
process they should follow, rather than the outcome they should aim for.
Instructors in the program urge students to review advertising awards annuals, advertising reels and magazines, magazines related to art, graphic design and other related fields, and to watch each other. On one hand, using these sources of examples brings students up to speed on what kind of work they should be doing and w